We examine performance implications of stock-based incentive programs. While agency theory makes a strong case for stock-based incentives, empirical evidence of the effect on firm performance is mixed at best. Using a novel hand-collected data-set of German Prime Standard firms, we also find that on average stock-based long-term incentives do not improve firm performance. However, when we distinguish between plans with and without ambitious performance hurdles, we find that granting stock-based incentives with weak performance hurdles goes along with poor post performance, while ambitious programs boosts firm performance. We confirm these findings by using different performance measures, addressing endogenity concerns, and controlling for various governance mechanisms like ownership and board structures, as well as other design dimensions of the stock-based incentive plans.
Introduction
In this paper we ask a simple question: Does granting stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI) improve corporate performance? SBLTI are part of management compensation packages granted by US firms since the 50s of last century (e.g. Lambert, Lanen and Larker, 1989) . Today, SBLTIs are nearly onmipresent in the US (e.g. Yermack, 1995) and the UK but also in other developed countries.
However, examining a unique hand-collected data we find that the answer to the above question seems to be generally no. Even worse, our analysis reveals that granting plain shares or stock options seems to have negative effects for firm performance. Then, however, the good news turn out and we find that granting SBLTI with ambitious performance hurdles seems to have substantial incentive effects and results in significantly higher operative performance.
It is well known that agency arguments make a strong case for SBLTI. However, so far empirical evidence on the effect of SBLTI upon firm performance is mixed (e.g. Palia, 2001; Lam and Chng, 2006) . To examine performance implications of SBLTI, we analyze a sample of German listed firms where some 37% of the firms have granted SBLTI in 2006. Germany provides a particular interesting setting for an analysis of SBLTI, since these kind of management incentives emergerd only in 1996 (e.g. Bernhardt, 1999) . Since then only a limited number of firms have implemented SBLTI programs, although the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) strongly recommends these kind of incentive elements (see Government Commission GCGC, 2008) . Moreover, historically accounting rules in Germany did not favor plain (or any type of) designs of SBLTI (as for instance in the US) and thus a broad variety of sometimes quite complex design structures emerged (e.g. Korn, Paschke and Uhrig-Homburg, 2008) .
Identifying German firms to represent an interesting research objective brings forward a major issue. There is, unfortunately, no commercial database offering access to detailed corporate governance information (e.g. ownership structures, compensation structures or board characteristics) for German firms. Accordingly, we set up a unique database containing hand-collected data on ownership structures, compensation structures and board characteristics. Using this database, we are able to identify firms that have granted SBLTI in 2006. Moreover, the database contains detailed information about the design of these SBLTI programs. We use this information to define an incentive index measuring whether the program design is characterized by ambitious performance hurdles. Thus our incentive index proxies the incentive effect of the SBLTI programs. We then examine the question whether granting SBLTI improves firm performance. Comparing firms with and without SBLTI in 2006 we find no difference in operative performance (or even slightly negative effects of SBLTIs). However, if we furthermore consider the incentive index, we find strong evidence that SBLTI programs with low incentive index (i.e. with weak performance hurdles) improve firm performance, while SBLTI programs with high incentive index (i.e. with ambitious performance hurdles) improve firm performance. The performance effect of our incentive index remains when we restrict our sample to SBLTI granting firms. Moreover, it is robust with respect to different codings of our incentive index, different performance measures, and different specifications of our regression models. Furthermore, we show that the results are robust against endogeneity concerns and concerns that it is a simple governance argument that drives the result (e.g. Sautner and Weber, 2008) .
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we provide evidence, that in European countries SBLTI are not as common as in the US. Specifically, within our sample we find that less than half of the largest 400 German listed firms grant SBLTI. A detailed analysis reveals that in particular large firms with dispersed ownership structure grant SBLTI. Second, we provide evidence about the design of SBLTI plans outside the US. Similar to Sautner and Weber (2008) our analysis reveals significant heterogeneity between different programs. Examining this issue in more detail, we find that it in particular board characteristics determine the design of SBLTI plans. Third, we contribute to the discussion about the effect of SBLTI programs by examining the effect of ambitious performance hurdles upon firm performance. We find that only SBLTI with ambitious performance hurdles improve firm performance. Finally, this study provides the first large sample study of SBLTI in German firms that we know about.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 describes the data set and gives some descriptive statics on our incentive index. Section 4 provides our empirical analysis, which then is discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. Further tables and some general remarks about peculiarities of the German corporate governance system are provided in the appendix.
Stock-based long-term incentives and firm performance
Agency theory makes a strong case for stock-based incentives. As argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others stock-based incentives may serve as a substitute for non-perfect managerial ownership by alleviating the principal agency problem (e.g. Fahlenbrach, 2009) . 1 This incentive alignment argument states that managerial stock ownership and SBLTI programs are positively related to firm performance. There are, however, some papers arguing that SBLTI are powerful mechanisms for managers to extract resources from the sphere of shareholders (e.g. Bebchuk , Fried and Walker, 2002 and others) . The entrenchment effect runs counter the alignment effect and it remains an empirical question which of the two effects dominates.
So far empirical evidence on the effect of SBLTI upon firm performance is mixed. One the one hand there are studies that examine the announcement effects of changes in compensation plans (e.g. Brickley, Bhagat and Lease, 1985; Defusco, Johnson and Zorn, 1990; Yermack, 1995) . On the other hand, there are studies which evaluate the effects of stock options on (operative) firm performance on the long run. Mehran (1995) , for instance, finds a positive correlation between firm performance and the percentage of total equity compensation, where firm performance is measured by Tobin's Q as well as return on assets. Recently, a study of Lam and Chng (2006) supports this correlation between equity based compensation and firm performance. 2 Moreover, some studies examine performance implications of the design of SBLTI. Generally, these studies focus on a single incentive design feature. Chi and Johnson (2008) analyse the implications of the vesting period. They find that operative performance is positively correlated with management incentives and that the extend of the correlation increases in vesting period length. Another design feature, the performance hurdle, has been analysed by Bettis et al. (2008) . In their study they document a significant better operating performance of the firms with a performance hurdle than the performance of the control firms.
Our point of departure is the assumption that SBLTIs are used as a tool to mitigate the principal agency conflict. In line with this argument, Rapp, Schaller and Wolff (2008) document in a related 1 Several authors examine the relation between management ownership and corporate performance. McConnell and Servaes (1990) , for instance, find such a concave relation while Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) demonstrate that any such relation is spurious after correcting for the endogenous character of executive compensation. Several studies of managerial ownership also take SBLTI into account, e.g. Bizjak, Brickley and Coles (1993) and Core and Guay (1999) .
2 Zhou (2001) illustrates that managerial ownership and stock based compensation should be analysed simultaneous.
paper that in Germany SBLTIs are rarely used in firms with high levels of managerial ownership.
However, we find that generally SBLTI do not improve firm performance. To examine the issue in more detail, we then take a closer look at the various SBLTI programs and define an incentive index measuring the ambitiousness of these programs. Therefore, we subsume various design features of SBLTI into one index to deduce implications of the overall incentive design of a SBLTI on operative firm performance. Sautner and Weber (2008) also aggregate various design features of SBLTI into one scoring model. However, they define their index in a different way and challenge a different research question. Consistent with the managerial power interpretation, they hypothesise that CEOs in firms with weak governance structures receive more friendly designed option plans and find that CEO-friendly stock-based incentive programs are correlated with lower subsequent performance in their sample of 83 European firms.
Data and definition of variables
This section describes our sample selection procedure, how we compile our data set and the way we code the incentive index. This section also gives an overview of the governance and other firm characteristics we use in our regression models. Finally, in the following first descriptive statics were provided. search and requests to investor relation departments.
Sample construction

Constructing the incentive index
The index evaluates four main design elements: (i) performance hurdles, (ii) combination of performance hurdles, (iii) reference period for performance hurdles and (iv) vesting period. Moreover, the most important category performance hurdles is divided into three subcategories: (a) absolute share price performance hurdle, (b) relative share price performance hurdle and (c) accounting based performance hurdle. For each firm we score each of the six categories with 0, 1 or 2. Higher scores indicate that the respective design feature provokes higher incentives for the CEO.
As suggested by Johnson and Tian (2000) SBLTI should filter out stock price changes that are due to general market trends (windfall profits) and that hence are unrelated to individual performance (see also Holmstrom, 1979; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Kuang and Suijs, 2006) . The design element to filter out this general market trend is a performance hurdle. One performance hurdle is the relative share price performance hurdle. Thereby the CEO is only rewarded for the outperformance of his firm compared to a standard stock index or better to a basket of similar firms. Especially a sector benchmark ties an executive's reward more closely to firm-specific performance, over which he has considerable control (Bebchuk , Fried and Walker, 2002) . Instead of filtering ex post, there is also the possibility to forecast the average stock rise of the market and to define this percentage ex ante so that this is a barrier for the future payoff. Thereby we rank these absolute performance hurdles according to their percentage value below respectively above the median to either score this design feature with 1 or 2.
A third type of a performance hurdle is the accounting based one. Thereby the score for SBLTIs which have a transparent accounting based hurdle is 2. Programs where an accounting based hurdle exists, but is irreproducible, the subscore is 1. If a performance hurdle of a corresponding category does not exist, the subscore is always 0. Beyond, many of the programs use a absolute as well as a relative share price performance hurdle. For these programs the next category, the combination of the performance hurdles, evaluates the link between these performance hurdles. If only one of the hurdles have to be reached to get the payoff the score is 1. We assume that the best incentive is affected by programs where the CEO will be rewarded only in case of reaching all the demanded targets. Consequently, in all these cases the score is 2. The forth category, the reference period for performance hurdles focuses on temporal requirements to reach the hurdle. 
Other governance variables and firm characteristics
Beside the above mentioned compensation data, we use several additional variables in our empirical analysis: measures of firm performance, measures of ownership structure, board characteristics, and firm characteristics. 
Descriptive statics
In table 2 programs demand their CEO to reach only one of the hurdles. In 61% of these cases both targets have to be reached. In 54% SBLTIs with a performance hurdle provide a period to reach the target, while in 46% of the SBLTI programs a referace date is implemented. In the other 46% the hurdle has to be reached on a fixed date. In three cases (2%) the description of the programs does not say anything about a vesting period. These numbers are rather suprising compared to the US, where firms seem to refrain from using performance hurdles (e.g. Murphy, 1999).
[ - Table 2 goes about here -]
As already noted, there s large heterogeneity in the design of SBLTI. This results in large heterogeneity of index scores as illustrated in figure 1. The figure reports the absolute frequencies of the scores of our incentive index INC and our governance index GOV, which we use in the robustness section, measured over all all firms in our sample that have granted SBLTI in 2006. Due to the heterogeneity in index scores, we expect our incentive index to be a valid instrument to discriminate between weak and ambitious programs. Similarly, we expect our governance index GOV to be a valid instrument to separate management friendly programs.
[ - Figure [ - Table 3 goes about here -]
Performance implications of stock-based long-term incentives
This section discusses the methodology and presents our main results.
Empirical specification
We are interested in the effect of SBLTI and their design on firm performance. In our main analysis we use ordinary least squares models to examine this issue. The dependent variable is operative firm performance measured by return on equity. Most of our analyses are done in two steps. First, we estimate a slim specification, where we control for standard firm characteristics and dominant blockholders. Second, we challenge these results by considering lagged firm performance, more detailed information on firm characteristics and ownership structures, as well as founder status and board structure. To address endogeneity concerns, we also apply instrument variable (IV) estimation methods (see section 5). Generally, we estimate a firm performance model of the following form:
FIRM PERFORMANCE = f (SBLTI, design of SBLTI, firm characteristics, ownership variables, board characteristics, other controls),
where FIRM PERFORMANCE is measured as return on equity. For comparison and to check validity of our results we also use return on assets as dependent variable (see section 5).
In the course of our discussion, we also examine which firms actually grant SBLTI. This is done by estimating variants of the following incentive model:
where SBLTI is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in case that the firms did grant stockbased long-term incentives in 2006.
Moreover, we examine the relation between our incentive index, firm characteristics and governance mechanisms of a firm. This is done by estimating variants of our incentive model:
where INC denotes the incentive index score.
Empirical results
Our main regression results are presented in on a 1% significance level. In these models however we now detect a significant negative influence of stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI) on firm performance. Our evidence on the role of the incentive design features, therefore supports the existing results analysing one of these features on its own (e.g. Chi and Johnson, 2008; Bettis et al., 2008) . For the other independent variables we still see the mentioned correlations of model 1.1.a and 1.1.b. Beside we also find a positive correlation between diversification (DIV) and firm performance (ROE 06+ROE 07) on an acceptable significance level in model 1.2.b. Model 1.3a and 1.3b are estimated on the subsample of firms granting stockbased long-term incentives (SBLTI). Thereby the positive link of a high incentive score of a stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI) and firm performance (ROE 06+ROE 07) is confirmed. The correlation is still significant on a 1% level. As before we find the positive link between managerial ownership (MB CONTROL) now also in the large model 1.3b., whereas the influence of family ownership (FAMILY) is no more statistical significant. In contrast to the models before, the correlation between leverage (LEV) and firm performance (ROE 06+ROE 07) reaches statistical significance.
[ - Table 4 goes about here -] The result of model 1.2.a of table 4 is illustrated in figure 2 below. While on average we find no effect of stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI) on corporate performance (ROE 06+ROE 07), examining the issue in more detail we find a discriminating effect of ambitious performance hurdles. In model 1.2.a we find that stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI) with low incentive score are related to poor future firm performance (ROE 06+ROE 07), while stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI) with high incentive score produce superior future firm performance (ROE 06+ROE 07). Looking at the figure, we find that the effect is balanced for stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI) programs with an incentive score of 5.
[ - Figure 2 goes about here -]
Discussion and robustness
In this section we critically discuss the results from the previous section. Therefore, we discuss six problems in more detail. In section 5.1 we examine which firms actually grant SBLTI. In section 5.2 we challenge our results by examining the determinants of the incentive index, in particular past performance. In section 5.3 we re-examine the above results by using another measure of firm performance.
In section 5.4 we address endogeneity concerns using instrument variable estimates. In section 5.5 we challenge our findings by simultaneously using a governance index. Finally, in section 5.6 we re-examine our main research question by using alternative indices.
Which firms grant stock-based long-term incentives?
The first question that is of interest in the context of our analysis is the question which firms actually grant SBLTI. From the descriptive analysis we know that some 37% of our sample firms have granted SBLTI in 2006. In table 5 we examine this issue in more detail by estimating variants of our incentive model (2).
In the empirical analysis we use probit regression models to determine the effect of lagged performance, firm characteristics, ownership structures, active founders and supervisory board characteristics upon the probability of granting stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI). Two findings emerge.
First, large firms with high market-to-book ratio and dispersed ownership structure are more likely to grant SBLTI. Second, lagged performance does not significantly contribute to this probability. The latter result is of particular interest, since it relaxes the view that managers of poorly performing firms are less likely to accept SBLTI (and vice verse).
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[ - Table 5 goes about here -]
What determines the Design of SBLTI?
Another possible concern might come to ones mind. Perhaps managers of well performing firms are more likely to accept ambitious performance hurdles. All coefficients of past performance (ROE 04, ROE 04+05) are negative (but insignificant). Thus, we find no evidence for the hypothesis that our results are flawed since managers of well performing firms are more likely to accept ambitious performance hurdles.
We use OLS, poisson, and ordered probit regression models to estimate variants of our incentive model (3).
[ - Table 7 goes about here -]
Are the results robust to other specifications of firm performance?
The second question of interest is, whether our results are robust to alternative performance measures.
In table 6 we examine this issue in more detail by using the aggregated return on assets in 2006 and 2007 (ROA 06+ROA 07) as the dependent variable in our performance model (1).
We find that granting SBLTI has on average a slightly negative effect on return on assets. However, when we control for our incentive index, the results confirm our findings from the return on equity analysis in table 4.
[ - Table 6 goes about here -]
Are the results flawed by endogeneity problems?
Another issue that warrants attention is the problem of endogeneity. We challenge the OLS results of model (1) by using instrument variable (IV) estimation procedures. Table 8 Again, we find that granting SBLTI does not improve firm performance per se. Moreover, we confirm our main result that our incentive index differentiates between SBLTI with poor post performance and SBLTI programs with superior post performance.
[ - Table 8 goes about here -]
Are the results explained by governance arguments?
Next, we examine whether performance differences among firms with stock-based long-term incentives are simply a result of differences in governance mechanisms as argued by Sautner and Weber (2008) . Sautner and Weber find that management friendly SBLTI programs are correlated to poor post performance. In their analysis they code a friendliness index, which aggregates performance hurdles and governance dimensions of SBLTI programs. In order to examine whether our findings are simply driven by such governance arguments we code a second index, labeled GOV. As we can see in Table   12 , the governance index GOV evaluates six governance categories related to SBLTIs. Specifically, it evaluates SBLTI programs according to their management friendliness, considering the payout profile (e.g. caps) and the transparency level. A lower index score characterizes more (less) management friendly programs.
[ - Table 12 goes about here -]
In table 9 we report OLS regression results for variants of our performance model (1), where we simultaneously use the both indices as explanatory variables. In none of the specifications we find a significant effect of our governance index GOV. Thus, we find that with respect to post performance it is the incentive index that differentiates between SBLTI programs.
[ - Table 9 goes about here -]
Are the results sensitive to the coding of the indices?
As a final robustness test, we coded two variants of our indices. Instead of differentiating three outcomes for each category / subcategory, we aggregate outcomes with score 1 and 2 and assign a score of 1. the alternative indices are labeled INC 2 and GOV 2. Again, we estimate various variants of our performance model (1) using the SBLTI dummy, a variant of the incentive index (INC 2) and a variant of the governance index (GOV 2). 
A.2 The German board system
It is well known that the German corporate governance system is characterized by a two-tier system with two boards: the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and the management board (Vorstand). According to the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz -AktG) the supervisory board supervises ( §111 AktG) and appoints ( §84 AktG) the management board.
Beside the pure fact of the two-tier system there are two more peculiarities of the German board system to be kept in mind. First, German Stock Corporation Act regulates the minimum and the maximum number of supervisory board members. Specifically, §95 AktG says that the supervisory board has to consist of at least 3 members, must be a multiple of three with a maximum of 21 board members depending on firm size (measured in terms on subscribed capital). Second, the Co- Moreover, according to §107 AktG the supervisory board has to elect a chairman (as well as a deputy) and a may organize its work in committees. Except for the conciliation committee (Vermittlungsausschuss in accordance with §27 of the Co-determination Act for disputes between shareholder and employee representatives), the size and structure of these committees is not regulated. However, it is commonly assumed that each committee has to consist of at least two directors and even three directors to be a quorum.
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Figure 1: Distribution of incentive and governance index
Notes: The figure illustrates absolute frequencies of index realizations for firms granting stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTIs). Our incentive index INC evaluates four categories of a firm's SBLTI program. Thereby it pays particular attention to a program's performance hurdles. The incentive is coded in a way that it characterizes more (less) ambitious programs by a higher (lower) index score. Our governance index GOV evaluates six governance categories related to SBLTIs. It evaluates SBLTI programs according to their management friendliness, considering the payout profile (e.g. caps) and the transparency level. A lower index score characterizes more (less) management friendly programs. 
.a of table 4
Notes: The figure illustrates the results of model 1.2.a of table 4. On average we find no effect of stock-based long-term incentives on corporate performance (model 1.1.a/b of table 4). However, examining the issue in more detail we find a discriminating effect of ambitious performance hurdles. To measure these the extend of performance hurdles we construct our incentive index INC, which evaluates four categories of a firm's SBLTI program, in particular its performance hurdles. The incentive is coded in a way that it characterizes more (less) ambitious programs by a higher (lower) index score. In the empirical analysis we find that SBLTI programs with low incentive score are related to poor future firm performance, while SBLTI programs with high incentive score produce superior future firm performance. While the models 1.1.a/b and 1.2.a/b are estimated on the sample of all firms, the models 1.3.a/b are estimated on the subsample of firms granting stock-based long-term incentives. In the models 1.1.a/b we regress corporate performance on SBLTI (a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm grants stock-based long-term incentives). In the models 1.2.a/b we simultaneously use our incentive index INC (an index that characterizes more (less) ambitious programs by a higher (lower) index score). In the models 1.3.a/b only use our incentive index INC. In each of the models we control for various firm characteristics. While our a-specifications control for standard firm characteristics (SIZE, RISK, MTB, LEV) and the largest blockholder (MB CONTROL, EXT CONTROL), b-specifications also controll for lagged performance (ROE 05), diversification (DIV), more detailed ownership structures (FAMILY, INSTITUTIONAL, STRATEGIC, OTHER OWNERS), and founder status (CEO FOUNDER, CHM FOUNDER). We use 8 industry dummies in all regressions. The reported results remain robust to specifications where we use return on equity in 2006 (ROE 06) or return on equity in 2007 (ROE 07) as dependent variable. All variables are described in detail in table 11. Values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%. (2). We use probit regression models to determine the effect of lagged performance, firm characteristics, ownership structures, active founders and supervisory board characteristics upon the probability of granting stock-based long-term incentives (SBLTI). Model 2.1 considers standard firm characteristics (SIZE, RISK, MTB, LEV) and the largest blockholder (MB CONTROL, EXT CONTROL). Model 2.2 also controll founder status (CEO FOUNDER, CHM FOUNDER) and supervisory board characteristics (SB SIZE, SB CODET). Model 2.3 uses more detailed information on ownership structures (FAMILY, INSTITUTIONAL, STRATEGIC, OTHER OWNERS). Model 2.4 extend model 2.3 by adding lagged performance (ROE 05). We use 8 industry dummies in all regressions. All variables are described in table 11. Despite McFadden R2, we also report the LR-statistic and the proportional change criterium (PCC). Values in parentheses are Huber/White QML robust z-statistics. * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%. . While the models 3.1.a/b and 3.2.a/b are estimated on the sample of all firms, the models 3.3.a/b are estimated on the subsample of firms granting stock-based long-term incentives. In the models 3.1.a/b we regress corporate performance on SBLTI (a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm grants stock-based long-term incentives). In the models 3.2.a/b we simultaneously use our incentive index INC (an index that characterizes more (less) ambitious programs by a higher (lower) index score). In the models 3.3.a/b only use our incentive index INC. In each of the models we control for various firm characteristics. While our a-specifications control for standard firm characteristics (SIZE, RISK, MTB, LEV) and the largest blockholder (MB CONTROL, EXT CONTROL), b-specifications also controll for lagged performance (ROE 05), diversification (DIV), more detailed ownership structures (FAMILY, INSTITUTIONAL, STRATEGIC, OTHER OWNERS), and founder status (CEO FOUNDER, CHM FOUNDER). We use 8 industry dummies in all regressions. All variables are described in detail in table 11. Values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%. . We use OLS, poisson, and ordered probit regression models to determine the effect of lagged performance, firm characteristics, ownership structures, active founders and supervisory board characteristics upon our incentive index INC (an index that characterizes more (less) ambitious programs by a higher (lower) index score). While the models 4.1, 4.3 and 4.5 use two-period lagged return on equity as explanatory variable, the other use the sum of two-period lagged return on equity and one-period lagged return on equity (ROE 04+ROE 05) as explanatory variable. All models are estimated on the sample of all firms granting of stock-based long-term incentives in 2006 and consider standard firm characteristics (SIZE, RISK, MTB, LEV), detailed information on ownership structures (FAMILY, INSTITUTIONAL, STRATEGIC, OTHER OWNERS), founder status (CEO FOUNDER, CHM FOUNDER) and compensation committee characteristics (COMP COM SIZE, COMP COM CODET). We use 8 industry dummies in all regressions. All variables are described in table 11. We report adj. R 2 and Pseudo R 2 , as well as the corresponding F-and LR-statistic. Values in parentheses are robust t-statistics and z-statistics, respectively. * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%. . The a-and b-specifications of our models are estimated on the sample of all firms. The c-specifications are estimated on the subsample of firms granting stock-based long-term incentives. In each specification we allow for a maximum of two endogenous variables and use the following instruments: lagged performance (ROE 05 or ROA 05), tenure of the firm's CEO and chairman (CEO TENURE, CHM TENURE), size and structure of the compensation committee (COMP COM SIZE, COMP COM CODET) and index listing (DAX, MDAX, SDAX, TECDAX). Despite our compensation variables, we control for standard firm characteristics (SIZE, RISK, MTB, LEV) and the largest blockholder (MB CONTROL, EXT CONTROL) and use 8 industry dummies. All variables are described in detail in table 11. Values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%. In the models 7.1.a/b we regress corporate performance on SBLTI (a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm grants stock-based long-term incentives) and INC_2, which is a variant of our incentive index INC (an index that characterizes more (less) ambitious programs by a higher (lower) index score). In the remaining models we simultaneously use GOV_2, which is a variant of our governance index GOV (an index that characterizes more (less) management friendly programs by a lower (higher) index score). All six models are estimated on the sample of all firms. In each of the models we control for various firm characteristics. While our a-specifications control for standard firm characteristics (SIZE, RISK, MTB, LEV) and the largest blockholder (MB CONTROL, EXT CONTROL), b-specifications also control for lagged performance (ROE 05 or ROA 05), diversification (DIV), more detailed ownership structures (FAMILY, INSTITUTIONAL, STRATEGIC, OTHER OWNERS), and founder status (CEO FOUNDER, CHM FOUNDER). We use 8 industry dummies in all regressions. The reported results remain robust to specifications where we use return on equity in 2006 (ROE 06) or return on equity in 2007 (ROE 07) as dependent variable. All variables are described in detail in table 11. Values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%. Dummy variable which takes the value 1 in case that the current chairman was a member of the firm's founding team CHM TENURE Variable measuring the tenure of the firm's current chairman SB CAPITAL Number of supervisory board members representing interests of capital suppliers of the firm SB CODET Variable measuring co-determination which can take the values zero (in case of no co-determination), 0.5 (in case of one-third codetermination) and 1 (in case of parity co-determination) COMP COM SIZE Size of compensation committee measured as the number of supervisory board members concerned with the firm's compensation policy COMP COM CODET Dummy variable which takes the value 1 in case that employee representatives are members of the compensation committee Industry 8 dummy variables for different industries based on the Prime Standard industry classification of Deutsche Börse AG DAX, MDAX, SDAX, TECDAX Dummy variables taking the value 1 in case that the firm is listed in the DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TECDAX, respectively Notes: The table describes the set of variables that we use in our empirical ananlyses. While we retrieve accounting data from Thomson Financial Worldscope and Datastream, all governance variables like ownership data, board characteristics and compensation data are hand-collected from various sources. Among others, we used annual reports, press releases, IR requests, Hoppenstedt Aktienführer, SEC releases, ISA plus/ Deloitte and Deutsche Börse Weighting Files. 
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